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1  Introduction
The Baldwin effect occurs, if it ever does, when a biological trait becomes innate as a 
result of first being learned.  Suppose that some trait is initially absent from a 
population of organisms.  Then a number of organisms succeed in learning the trait.  
There will be a Baldwin effect if this period of learning leads to the trait becoming 
innate throughout the population.
Put like that, it sounds like Lamarckism.  But that is not the idea.  When James Mark 
Baldwin and others first posited the Baldwin effect over a hundred years ago, their 
concern was precisely to uncover a respectable Darwinian mechanism for the Baldwin 
effect 1[1].  The great German cytologist Augustus Weismann had already persuaded 
them that there is no automatic genetic inheritance of acquired characteristics:  the 
ontogenetic acquisition of a phenotypic trait cannot in itself alter the genetic material 
of the lineage that has acquired it.  The thought behind the Baldwin effect is in effect 
that an alternative Darwinian mechanism might nevertheless mimic Lamarckism, in 
allowing learning to influence genetic evolution, but without requiring Lamarck’s 
own discredited hypothesis that learning directly affects the genome.
Why should we be interested in the possibility of Baldwin effects?  One reason the 
topic attracts attention is no doubt that it seems to soften the blind randomness of 
natural selection, by allowing the creative powers of mind to make a difference.  Still, 
there are other good reasons for being interested in the Baldwin effect, apart from 
wanting some higher power to direct the course of evolution.
Consider the many innate behavioural traits whose complexity makes it difficult to 
see how they can be accounted for by normal natural selection.  I have in mind here 
innate traits that depend on a number of components that are of no obvious advantage 
on their own.  For example, woodpecker finches in the Galapagos Islands use twigs or 
cactus spines to probe for grubs in tree braches.  This behaviour is largely innate 
(Tebbich et al 2001).  It also involves a number of different behavioural 
dispositions—finding possible tools, fashioning them if necessary, grasping them in 
the beak, using them to probe at appropriate sites—none of which would be any use 
by itself.  For example, there is no advantage in grasping tools if you aren’t disposed 
to probe with them, and no advantage to being disposed to probe with tools if you 
never grasp them.  Now, insofar as the overall behaviour is innate, these different 
behavioural components will presumably depend on various independently inheritable 
genes.  However, this then makes it very hard to see how the overall behaviour can 
possibly be selected for.  In order for the behaviour to be advantageous, all the 
components have to be in place.  But this will require that all the relevant genes be 
                                                
1[1]  In  the 1890s Henry Osborne and Conwy Lloyd Morgan had also proposed that non-Lamarkian 
processes could lead to acquired characteristics becoming innate.  Given this, ‘Baldwin has done well 
to have become the namesake for the effect’, as Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003) observes.  The familiar 
term ‘The Badwin Effect’ is due to George Gaylord Simpson’s 1953 article of that title, which 
ironically was largely concerned to belittle the effect.  For much more interesting history of the 
Baldwin effect, see Griffiths (2003).   
present together.  However, if these are initially rare, it would seem astronomically 
unlikely that they would ever co-occur in one individual.  And, even if they did, they 
would quickly be split up by sexual reproduction.  So the relevant genes, taken singly, 
would seem to have no selective advantage which would enable them to be favoured 
by natural selection.
But now add in the Baldwin effect.  This now promises a way to overcome the 
selective barrier.  We need only suppose that some individuals are occasionally able 
to acquire the behaviour using some kind of general learning mechanism.  If they can 
succeed in this, then the Baldwin effect can kick in, and explain how the behaviour 
becomes innate.  Thus behaviours whose selection seems mysterious from the point of 
view of orthodox natural selection can become explicable with the help of the 
Baldwin effect.
But I am getting ahead of myself.  This last suggestion assumes that the Baldwin 
effect is real, and that has yet to be shown.  In the rest of this paper I shall explore 
possible mechanisms for the Baldwin effect, and consider whether they may be of any 
biological significance.  My general verdict will be positive.  I shall aim to show how 
there are indeed mechanisms which can give rise to Baldwin effects, and moreover 
that there is some reason to think that such Effects have mattered to the course of 
evolution.
I became interested in the Baldwin effect because it has always seemed to me obvious 
that there is at least one kind of case where it operates—namely, with the social
learning of complex behavioural traits.  It will be helpful to consider this in broad 
outline before we get caught up in analytic details.  Suppose some complex 
behavioural trait P is socially learnt—individuals learn P from others, where they 
have no real chance of figuring it out for themselves.  This will then create selection 
pressures for genes that make individuals better at socially acquiring P.  But these 
genes wouldn’t have any selective advantage without the prior culture of P, since that 
culture is in practice necessary for any individual to learn P.  After all, there won’t be 
any advantage to a gene that makes you better at learning P from others, if there aren’t 
any others to learn P from.  So this then looks like a Baldwin effect:  genes for P are 
selected precisely because P was previously acquired via social learning. 
By way of an example, consider the woodpecker finches again, and suppose that there 
was a time when their tool-using behaviour was not innate but socially learned2[2].  
That is, young woodpecker finches would learn how to use tools from their parents 
and other adepts.  Now, this socially transmitted culture of tool use would give a 
selective advantage to genes that made young finches better at learning the trick.  For 
example, it would have created pressure for a gene that disposed finches to grab 
suitable tools if they saw them, since this would give them a head start in learning the 
rest of the grub-catching behaviour from their elders.  But this gene wouldn’t have 
been advantageous on its own, in the absence of the tool-using culture, since even 
finches with that gene wouldn’t have been able to learn the rest of the tool-using 
behaviour, without anyone to teach them.    
                                                
2[2]  There are well-evidenced examples of tool use being transmitted culturally in other birds and in 
primates.  Hunt and Gray (2003), Whiten et al. (1999).
In what follows I shall be particularly interested in cases of this kind—that is, cases 
where social learning gives rise to Baldwin effects.  From the beginning, theorists 
have often mentioned social learning in connection with the Baldwin effect, but 
without pausing to analyse its special significance.  (For an early example, see 
Baldwin himself, 1896;  for a recent one, see Watkins, 1999.)  I shall offer a detailed 
explanation of the connection between social learning and Baldwin effects. As we 
shall see, there are two main biological mechanisms that can give rise to Baldwin 
effects—namely, ‘genetic assimilation’ and ‘niche construction’.  Social learning has 
a special connection with the Baldwin effect because it is prone to trigger both of 
these mechanisms.  When we have social learning, then we are likely to find cases 
where niche construction and genetic assimilation push in the same direction, and thus 
create powerful biological pressures.
Much recent literature argues that, while there are indeed biological processes that fit 
the specifications of the Baldwin effect, it is a mistake to highlight the Baldwin effect 
itself as some theoretically significant biologically mechanism.  (Cf. Downes, 2003, 
Griffiths, 2003.)  Rather, Baldwin-type examples are simply special cases of more 
general biological processes.  In particular, they are special cases of either genetic 
assimilation or niche construction.  This is a perfectly reasonable point.  As we shall 
see, genetic assimilation and niche construction are the two main sources of Baldwin 
effects, and both of these processes are of more general significance, in that they don’t 
only operate in cases where a learned behaviour comes to be innate, but in a wider 
range of cases, many of which may involve neither learning nor behaviour. 
Still, if we focus on the social learning cases I am interested in, then the Baldwin 
effect re-emerges as a theoretically important category.  These cases are important, as 
I said, precisely because they combine both niche construction and genetic 
assimilation.  This combination gives rise to particularly powerful biological 
pressures, and for this reason is worth highlighting theoretically.  Moreover, this 
combination of pressures arises specifically when a socially learned behaviour leads 
to its own innateness, and is not found more generally.  So the Baldwin effect turns 
out to be theoretically significant after all.
2  Preliminaries: Genetic Control, Innateness, and Social Learning
Before proceeding to analysis of the Baldwin effect itself, it will be helpful to clarify 
various preliminary issues.  In this section I shall first discuss the selective advantages 
and disadvantages of having behavioural traits controlled by genes rather than 
learning, and then explain what I mean by ‘innate’ and ‘social learning’ respectively 
in the context of the Baldwin effect.
2.1  Genetic Control versus Learning
In the woodpecker finch example above, I took it for granted that it would be 
selectively advantageous for the relevant behaviour to depend on genes rather than 
learning.  Since this assumption is generally required for the Baldwin effect, and since 
it is by no means always guaranteed to be true, it will be useful briefly to discuss the 
conditions under which it will be satisfied.
It might seem unlikely that there will ever be any selective advantageous to bringing 
some trait P under genetic control, given that it can be learned anyway.  If some 
adaptive P is going to be acquired by learning in any case, what extra advantage 
derives from its genetic determination?
Well, one response is that P won’t always be acquired in any case, if it is not 
genetically fixed.  Learning is hostage to the quirks of individual history, and a given 
individual may fail to experience the environments required to instil some learned 
trait.  Moreover, even if the relevant environments are reliably available, the business 
of learning P may itself involve immediate biological costs, diverting resources from 
other activities, and delaying the time at which P becomes available.  
These obvious advantages to genetic fixity—reliability and cheapness of 
acquisition—can exert a greater or lesser selective pressure, depending on how far 
genetic fixity outscores learning in these respects.  On the other side, however, must 
be placed the loss of flexibility that genetic fixity may entail.  Learning will normally 
be adaptive across a range of environments, in each case producing a phenotype that 
is advantageous in the current environment.  Thus, if the environment were to vary in 
such a way as to make P maladaptive, an organism with genes that fix P may well be 
less fit than one which relies on learning, since the latter would not be stuck with P, 
and may instead be able to acquire some alternative phenotype adapted to the new 
environment.
As a general rule, then, we can expect that genetic fixity will be favoured when there 
is long-term environmental stability, and that learning will be selected for when there 
are variable environments.  Given environmental stability, genetic fixity will have the 
aforementioned advantages of reliable and cheap acquisition.  But these advantages 
can easily be outweighed by loss of flexibility when there is significant environmental 
instability.  
In thinking about these issues, it is helpful to think of the relevant behaviours as 
initially open to shaping by some repertoire of relatively general learning mechanisms 
(perhaps including classical and instrumental conditioning, plus various modes of 
social learning).  The question is then whether the behavioural trait in question should 
be switched, so to speak, from the control of those general learning mechanisms to 
direct genetic control.  However, perhaps it should not be taken for granted that the 
general learning repertoire will itself be unaffected by such switching.  Maybe 
bringing one behavioural trait under genetic control will make an organism less 
efficient at learning other behavioural traits.  (Cf. Godfrey-Smith, 2003.)  For example, 
the woodpecker finches may be less able to learn to learn other ways of feeding, once 
their tool-using behaviour becomes genetically rigid.  If so, this too will need to be 
factored in when assessing the selective gains and losses of bringing some behaviour 
under genetic control.
Exactly how the pluses and minuses of genetic control versus learning work out will 
depend on the parameters of particular cases.3[3]  Still, I hope it is clear enough that 
there will be some cases where genetic fixity will have the overall biological 
                                                
3[3]  For a detailed quantitative analysis of the relative costs of learning and genetic control, see Mayley 
(1996).
advantage, even if there are other cases where learning will be biologically 
preferable.4[4]  So from now on I shall assume we are dealing with examples where the 
selective advantages of genetic control does outweigh the costs, since it is specifically 
these cases that create the possibility of Baldwin effects      
2.2  ‘Innate’
So far I have been proceeding as if there were a clear distinction between ‘innate’ and 
‘acquired’ traits.  However, I do not think that this distinction is at all clear-cut.  No 
definite meaning attaches to the notion of an ‘innate trait’, once we move away from 
the genome itself to any kind of phenotypic trait, since nothing outside the genome is 
determined by the genes alone (even the appearance of basic organs can be disrupted 
by non-standard environments).  True, there are a number of other criteria which are 
widely taken to constitute ‘innateness’, such as presence at birth, universality through 
the species, being a product of natural selection, and high developmental insensitivity 
to environmental variation.  However, these criteria all dissociate in both directions in 
real-life cases.  Because of this, the notion of innateness can be a source of great 
confusion.  If you ask me, far more harm than good results from unthinking 
deployment of this notion.  (Cf. Griffiths, 2002.)
Even so, it will be convenient for the purposes of this paper to continue to talk about 
traits that are at one time ‘acquired’ later becoming ‘innate’.  When I use this 
terminology, I should be understood in terms of the last criterion mentioned above, 
that is, high developmental insensitivity to environmental variation.  I shall take a trait 
to be innate to the extent that it has a ‘flat norm of reaction’, that is, to the extent that 
it reliably occurs across a wide range of developmental contexts.  Note that it follows 
from this criterion that a trait will not be innate to the extent it is ‘learned’, given that 
learning can be understood as a mapping from different developmental environments 
to different phenotypes.5[5]
Given this understanding of innateness, then, innateness comes out as a matter of 
degree:  as observed above, no non-genomic traits have a completely flat norm of 
reaction, in the sense of developing in all environments;  at most, we will find that 
some traits are less sensitive to environmental variation than others.  This does not 
worry me.  A comparative notion of innateness will be perfectly adequate for the 
purposes of this paper.  It will be interesting enough if we find Baldwin effects where 
the prior learning of certain traits leads to the selection of new genes that make traits 
less sensitive to environmental variation, rather than absolutely insensitive.  Talk 
about traits becoming innate should be understood in this comparative way from now 
on.
In this connection, it may be helpful to think of behavioural traits in terms of neural 
pathways in the brain.  The trait will be present when appropriate sensory inputs 
                                                
4[4]  In contexts where learning has the biological advantage over genetic fixity, then we might well find 
‘reverse Baldwin effects’, with some trait originally under genetic control coming to depend on 
learning instead.
5[5]  Some favour the far more controversial thesis that not being learned is sufficient as well as 
necessary for innateness, at least in the context of psychological traits:  that is, not only are 
psychological traits not innate if they are learned, but also that they are innate if they are not learned.  
Cf. Samuels (2002);  see also Cowie (1999).
trigger relevant motor outputs.  Some genomes may leave a large ‘gap’ between 
sensory and motor pathways, in which case general learning mechanisms will have 
plenty of work to do in closing them.  Other genomes may only leave a small such 
gap, one that can be closed with a minimum of environmental input.  However, 
general evolutionary considerations suggest that it will be unusual to find no gap at all.  
(Why bother with genes that close the gap entirely, once it is so small that nearly all 
normal environments will bridge it?  In this connection, note that even the highly 
innate tool use of the Galapagos woodpecker finches still require a modicum of 
individual trail-and-error learning during a short critical period. (Tebbich et al., 2001.)) 
2.3  ‘Social Learning’
I shall use the term ‘social learning’ to cover all processes by which the display of 
some behaviour by one member of a species increases the probability that other 
members will perform that behaviour.  This covers a numbers of different 
mechanisms, but I intend my analysis of social learning and Baldwin effects to apply 
to them all.
Thus we can distinguish (cf. Shettleworth, 1998, Tomasello, 2000):
(i)  Stimulus Enhancement.  Here one animal’s doing P merely increases the 
likelihood that other animals’ behaviour will become conditioned to relevant stimuli 
via individual learning.  For example, animals follow each other around—novices will 
thus be led by adepts to sites where certain behaviours are possible (pecking into milk 
bottles, say, or washing sand off potatoes) and so be more likely to acquire those 
behaviours by individual trial-and-error.
(ii)  Goal Emulation.  Here animals will learn from others that certain resources are 
available, and then use their own devices to achieve them.  Thus they might learn 
from others that there are ants under stones, or berries in certain trees.
(iii)  Blind Mimicry.  Here animals copy the movements displayed by others, but 
without appreciating to what end these movements are a means.   While it is possible 
that some non-human animals can do this, it seems to be a relatively high-level ability.
(iv)  Learning about Means to Ends.  Here animals grasp that some conspecific’s 
behaviour is a means to some end, and copy it when they want that end.  There is little 
evidence that non-human animals can do this (but see Akins and Zentall, 1998).   
These processes differ in significant ways.  For example, (i) and (ii), unlike (iii) and 
(iv), do not lend themselves to cumulative culture, since any technical sophistication 
developed by one individual will not be passed on to the others who duplicate their 
behaviour (Boyd and Richerson, 1996, Tomasello, 2000).  Again, (iii)—blind 
mimicry—but not the other modes of social learning, is highly sensitive to which
individuals are taken as models, since in this case there is no further mechanism to 
ensure that only adaptive behaviours are copied.  Differences like these may well 
interact interestingly with the Baldwin effect.  However, I shall not pursue these 
complexities in what follows (though see footnote 10 below).  I shall simply assume 
the general definition of social learning given above, and stick to points that apply to 
all its species.
3  Why Does Learning Matter?
In an extremely illuminating article on the Baldwin effect, Peter Godfrey-Smith 
schematises the structure of the Effect roughly as follows (Godfrey-Smith, 2003).
Stage 0  The environment changes so as to make phenotype P adaptive.
Stage 1  Some organisms learn P and prosper accordingly.
Stage 2  There is selection of genes which make P innate.
Given this schematisation 6[6], Godfrey-Smith then raises the obvious question about 
the Baldwin effect.  Why should going through Stage 1 be crucial to reaching Stage 2?  
Why do we need any learning of P en route to the selection of genes for P?  After all, 
Stage 0 already ensures that organisms with P will survive better, and thus on its own 
would seem to guarantee that genes for P will have a selective advantage, whether or 
not there is any intermediate learning.  So won’t Stage 2—selection of genes for P—
be triggered immediately by Stage 0—phenotype P becomes adaptive, without any 
necessity of a detour through Stage 1?  
This worry is widely taken to show the Baldwin effect is a chimera.  John Watkins 
(1999), for example, has recently argued that the Baldwin effect is impossible on 
precisely these grounds.  Watkins allows that any organisms that do acquire P by 
learning will on that account be more likely to survive and pass on their genes.  
However, he points out, there is no reason to suppose that those organisms are 
especially likely to have the genes that make P innate, and so their surviving by 
learning P would seem to contribute nothing to the selection of those genes. 
However, Watkins is too quick to dismiss the possibility of Baldwin effects.  Despite 
his argument, there are various special cases where the selection of genes for P may 
indeed depend on P previously being learned.  Following Godfrey-Smith, I shall 
consider three possible such cases, which I shall call ‘Breathing Spaces’, ‘Niche 
Construction’, and ‘Genetic Assimilation’ respectively.
The first suggestion—breathing spaces—is simply the idea that populations of 
organisms may not survive long enough to allow the selection of the genes for P, if 
they are not able to learn P in the interim.  This seems to have been Baldwin’s own
thought.7[7]  Some environmental changes may be so drastic that the populations 
which undergo them will face extinction if they cannot adapt quickly.  In the face of 
such drastic environmental changes, learning may allow a significant number of 
organisms to acquire the necessary adaptive trait P, at a time where genes determining 
                                                
6[6]  Godfrey-Smith also requires selection of genes for learning at Stage 1.  This seems to me an 
unhelpful restriction, fostered by an excessive focus on genetic assimilation (sections 4 and 5 below).  
Pace Godfrey-Smith, there need be no Stage 1 selection of genes for learning in niche construction 
cases of Baldwin effects (sections 6 and 7).  
7[7]  See Baldwin (1896), section II.  In addition, there are indications (section III.2) that Baldwin also 
thought that the learned predominance of a trait would lead to sexual preferences for displays of that 
trait;  this would be a case of niche construction rather than breathing spaces.  Cf. Griffiths (2003) 
section 3. 
P are still rare.  This would then allow the population to stay around long enough for 
natural selection to drive the genes for P to fixity.
It is doubtful whether breathing spaces are of any real biological significance.  Few 
environmental changes seem likely to fit its requirements.  There are certainly plenty 
of environmental changes that destroy whole populations—the impact of an asteroid, 
the commercial destruction of a rain forest—but these are not the kind of catastrophes 
that can be averted by learning new adaptive tricks.  Conversely, environmental 
changes that are gradual enough to allow organisms to learn new tricks—climatic 
shifts, say, or the immigration of a new predator—will rarely be so urgent that the 
whole population would be under threat of complete extinction without the tricks, in 
which case there will be time for genetic selection to operate even without a learning 
stage.  Considerations such as these lead Godfrey-Smith to dismiss breathing spaces 
as of dubious importance, and I agree with him.  I shall say no more about breathing 
spaces in this paper.
That leaves niche construction and genetic assimilation.  With niche construction, the 
idea is that Stage 1 alters selective pressures so as render genes for P advantageous, 
when they weren’t in Stage 0.  With genetic assimilation, by contrast, the learning of 
P doesn’t alter selection pressures;  rather it is itself the function that renders certain 
genes advantageous.  Both these processes require extended discussion.  It will be 
convenient to begin with genetic assimilation, which will occupy the next two 
sections.  After that I shall return to niche construction.
4  The Baldwin Effect as Genetic Assimilation 
The notion of genetic assimilation is due to C.H. Waddington.  In the 1940s and 
1950s he investigated the way in which the selection of traits triggered by special 
environments could lead to those traits developing automatically across a wide range 
of environments.  Waddington applied this idea to biological development in general, 
not just to behavioural traits that are initially acquired by learning.  Still, our 
immediate concern here is with possible mechanisms for Baldwin effects, and so I 
shall focus on this kind of case, returning to Waddington’s wider concerns in the next 
section.
Let me introduce the logic of genetic assimilation by considering a simple model.  
Suppose n sub-traits, Pi, i = 1, . . ., n, are individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
for some adaptive behavioural phenotype P.  (You need to be able to find tool 
materials, fashion them, grasp them, . . .  As before, each individual sub-trait is no 
good without all the others.)  Each sub-trait can either be genetically fixed or acquired 
through learning.  (For this section’s purposes there is no need to assume that this will 
be social learning—any mode of learning will do.)  Suppose further that each sub-trait 
is under the control of a particular genetic locus:  one allele at this locus will 
genetically determine the sub-trait, while an alternative allele leaves the sub-trait 
plastic and so available for learning.  So, for sub-trait Pi, we have allele IG which 
genetically fixes Pi, and allele IL which allows it to be learned.   
To start with, the IGs that genetically determine the various Pis are rare, so that it is 
highly unlikely that any individual will have all n Pis genetically fixed.  Moreover, 
suppose that it is pretty difficult to get all n Pis from learning.  Still, given these 
specifications, organisms that have some Pis genetically fixed will face less of a task 
in learning the rest.  (If you are already genetically disposed to grab suitable twigs if 
you see them, you will have less to do to learn the rest of the tool-using behaviour.)  
Organisms who already have some IGs will have a head start in the learning race, so to 
speak, and so will be more likely to acquire the overall phenotype.  So the IGs that 
give them the head start will have a selective advantage over the ILs.  Natural 
selection will thus favour the IGs over the ILs, and in due course will drive the IGs to 
fixity.  The population will thus move through a stage where P is acquired by learning 
(Stage 1) to a stage where it is genetically fixed (Stage 2), thus yielding a prima facie 
Baldwin effect. 
This model is a simplification of one developed by Hinton and Nowlan (1987).  They 
ran a computer simulation of essentially the above structure using a ‘sexually 
reproducing’ population of neural nets, and showed that the dynamics of their 
simulation would indeed progressively replace the alleles IL which left the Pis to 
learning with the IGs that fixed them genetically.
To better see what is going on in this model, consider the standard worry about the 
natural selection of a complex of genes none of which is any good on its own.  Thus:  
‘What is the advantage of any IG on its own, given that it only fixes one Pi, which isn’t 
of any use without the other n-1 Pis?  Don’t we need all n IGs to occur together for any 
of them to yield a biological advantage?  But that is overwhelmingly unlikely, if they 
are initially rare, and anyway they would be split up by sexual reproduction, if they 
did ever co-occur.  So each IG on it own would seem to have no selective advantage.’
The above model allows a cogent answer to this argument:  each IG does have a 
selective advantage on its own, even in the absence of the other IGs, precisely because 
it makes it easier to learn the rest of P.  Even in the absence of other IGs at other loci, 
any given IG  will still be favoured by natural selection, because it will reduce the 
learning load and so make it more likely that its possessor will end up with the 
advantageous phenotype P.  This is what drives the progressive selection of the IGs in 
the model.  Each IG is advantageous whether or not there are IGs at other loci, simply 
because having an IG rather than an IL at any given locus will reduce the amount of 
further learning needed to get the overall P.
Given this last point, it will be worth thinking a bit about the precise sense in which 
the modelled process would constitute a Baldwin effect.  If we focus on any specific 
locus, it turns out that the prior learning allowed by that locus’s IL is unnecessary for 
the selection of the IG after all.  This IG will have an advantage over its alternative IL 
quite independently of any such prior learning.  For the possession of this IG by any 
given individual will reduce its overall learning load, by removing component Pi from 
the vagaries of learning and placing it under genetic control.  This remains true 
whatever alleles are at other loci, and even if no organisms have ever previously used 
the alternative IL to learn Pi.  So from this perspective the Baldwin effect seems to 
have disappeared.  Stage 1, in which the organisms learn Pi, seems to play no role in 
fostering the selection of IG, just as John Watkins suspected.
In order to see why the genetic assimilation model does indeed deliver a Baldwin 
effect, we need to adopt a wider perspective, and consider the progressive
accumulation of—not just one specific IG —but of all the IG alleles, at different loci, 
which contribute to the overall genetic fixity of P.  Recall that in the early stages of 
this process the various IGs are rare.  This means that, even if a lucky individual does 
have one or two IGs, any success in acquiring the overall P will depend on its learning 
the remaining Pis.  Moreover, it is precisely this possibility that gives the various IGs 
their initial selective advantage.  Any given IG is advantageous precisely because of 
the way it makes it more likely the organism will be able learn the remaining non-
innate components of P.
So now we do have a story in which learning matters.  The progressive selection of 
the whole complex of alleles hinges on the fact that organisms are able to learn 
elements of P.  We wouldn’t arrive at the final stages, where all the Pis get genetically 
fixed, were it not that in the early and intermediate stages the organisms were able to 
learn non-innate components of P—otherwise, to repeat, none of the IGs would have 
any initial selective advantage.  So, if we consider the overall accumulation of IGs, we 
will observe a sequence, with each stage causally necessary for the next, in which 
learned components of P are progressively replaced by innate ones.  The behaviour P 
becomes innate as a result of a process in which P’s earlier being learned plays an 
essential role.  The process is thus a Baldwin effect.
5  Waddington and Genomic Space
In this section I want to compare the model just outlined with Waddington’s original 
notion of genetic assimilation.  In the 1940s and 50s Waddington and others were 
interested in ‘canalization’, that is, in the buffering of adaptive traits against disruptive 
environments.  To the extent that some trait is highly important to fitness—having 
normal hands, say—it will be advantageous that it should appear across a wide range 
of environments, including various non-standard ones.  Because of this, Waddington 
and his associates wondered whether there could be selection for canalisation.  Could 
natural selection operate in favour of genomes which ‘flatten norms of reactions’ of 
important traits—that is, which ensure that these traits will appear in a wider range of 
environments that hitherto?
In a famous series of experiments, Waddington demonstrated that this could indeed 
happen.  For example, he subjected a population of fruit fly embryos to heat shocks.  
As a result, some failed to grow cross-veins on their wings (he called this trait 
‘veinless’).  By breeding from these individuals, he was able to select a strain that 
displayed the veinless trait even in the absence of early heat shocks.  (Waddington, 
1953) 
Waddington called his 1953 paper the ‘Genetic Assimilation of an Acquired 
Character’.  At first some of the fruit flies acquire the characteristic ‘veinless’ as a 
result an environment of heat shocks.  Then, under the artificial selective regime of 
the experiment, in which only flies with the veinless phenotype survive, we find flies 
that are innately veinless and can be further selected. 
Let us compare Waddington’s experiment with the model of the previous section.  
One obvious difference is that veinless is a morphological trait, rather than a 
behavioural one.  Moreover, it is only ‘learned’ in the extremely attenuated sense in 
which any environmentally dependent trait is ‘learned’;  certainly its acquisition is not 
the upshot of any general learning mechanism.  However, let us put these relatively 
inconsequential differences to one side, and focus on the question of whether 
Waddington’s examples display the same underlying mechanism as modelled in the 
last section.
On the surface, they certainly do not.  Veinlessness is not composed of a number of 
sub-traits, like some complex sequence of behaviour.  Nor, correspondingly, is there 
anything in Waddington’s analysis about a number of genetic loci, each of which can 
either innately determine some sub-trait, or leave it to environmental factors.
However, precisely because of these differences, Waddington’s examples are 
puzzling in a way that the kind of case modelled in the last section is not.  As has 
often been pointed out, there is no intrinsic reason why selecting flies that are 
veinless-if-heat-shocked should yield a population with an increased likelihood of 
innately veinless flies.  Think of the flies as having three types of genome:  those that 
ensure they have cross-veins even if heat shocked;  those that make them veinless-if-
heat-shocked;  and those that render them innately veinless.  Most of the flies in the 
original population had the first genome.  By subjecting them to heat shocks and 
selecting for veinlessness we get a population with the second genome.  Now, why 
should the third genome be more probable in the second population than in the first?  
Why, so to speak, should the second and third genomes’ similarity in phenotypic 
space—they are both capable of displaying veinlessness—mean that they are similar 
in genomic space—a population with the second genome makes the appearance of the 
third more likely?  (Cf. Mayley, 1996.)  Why, to revert to our original terms, should 
Stage 1, in which the trait is ‘learned’, be crucial to reaching Stage 2, where it is 
innate?
Well, here is one possible explanation.  Suppose veinlessness depends on two factors:  
(i) some developmentally important protein loses its required conformation, and (ii) 
the ‘heat shock protein’ needed to correct this is absent.  Both of these factors can be 
genetically determined, but normal flies lack the requisite genes.  Now think of 
environmental heat shocks as an alternative non-genetic way of causing the 
deformation in the developmental protein.  Even when this happens, most flies have 
the heat shock protein required to remedy this.  Some, however, have a genetic 
abnormality that means they lack the heat shock protein.  These flies will be 
distinguished by displaying veinlessness if heat shocked.  So selecting these latter 
flies yields a population that innately lacks the heat shock protein.  Thus any flies in 
this new population would end up innately veinless if they were also to have a genetic 
abnormality that deformed the developmental protein without heat shocks.  By 
contrast, this further abnormality would not produce innate veinlessness in normal 
flies, since they do have the heat shock protein which remedies the deformation.
This story now explains, in roughly the style of the last section’s model, why selecting 
for the phenotype veinless-if-heat-shocked should make the genome innately veinless
more accessible.  Two factors are necessary to make a fruit fly veinless: a deformed 
developmental protein, and a lack of the heat shock protein.  Even so, the gene that 
determines no heat shock protein is ‘advantageous’ on its own, precisely because it 
makes it easier to end up veinless, since it ensures veinlessness in those organisms 
who are subject to environmental heat shocks.  And so, once this ‘advantage’ has led 
to the selection of the gene for no heat shock protein, we only need one further gene, 
not two, to get innate veinlessness.8[8]
True, the match between this explanation and the last section’s model remains inexact.  
For one thing, my suggested explanation does not regard veinlessness itself as 
composed as a number of sub-traits;  rather the explanation works by factoring the 
determinants of veinlessness into independent components, not veinlessness itself.  In 
addition, while the last section’s model assumed innate and environmental 
alternatives (IL or IG) for all the components of P, my explanation of veinlessness only 
had factor (i)—deformation of the developmental protein—as environmentally 
acquirable;  the heat shock protein was either innately present or innately absent.
This shows that the model of the last section is rather more restrictive than is 
necessary to capture the underlying selective dynamics.  It is not essential that the trait 
at issue itself factors into independent sub-traits, as long it is causally depends on 
various independent factors that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient.  Nor 
is it required that all these factors are open to environmental as well as genetic 
causation;  there may be some initial genes which have a selective advantage because 
they mean that the trait will appear as soon as the environment supplies the other 
factors, even if the factors that these genes determine cannot themselves be 
environmentally caused.
Still, now I have discussed Waddington’s own cases, it will be convenient to return to 
the more restrictive model of the last section, as it applies to the examples which 
matter to this paper.  So when I talk about ‘genetic assimilation’ in what follows, I 
shall be referring to cases in which some behavioural trait itself decomposes into sub-
traits, each of which can either be environmentally of genetically determined, and 
where the initial selective advantage of all these genes derives from the fact that it 
makes it easier to learn the rest of the behaviour. 
6  Niche Construction
With genetic assimilation, prior learning of the trait P does not alter the selective 
pressures on the genes that might render P innate.  Rather, enhanced learning is the 
function which renders those genes advantageous.  At any stage in the genetic 
assimilation of P, these genes are preferable to alternative alleles because they make it 
more likely the rest of P will be learned—and this advantage does not depend on such
learning previously having occurred, only on its being possible henceforth.
                                                
8[8]8[8] Does this second gene arise from mutations in the ‘veinless-if-heat-shocked’ population, or was it 
always present in the original experimental population?  It is sometimes observed that there wouldn’t 
have been enough time in Waddington’s experiments for the relevant mutations.  And this might make 
it unclear why the Stage 1 selection for veinlessness-if-heat-shocked is needed en route to innate 
veinlessness:  if the genes for innate veinlessness were already available at Stage 0, then wouldn’t 
innate veinlessness always have been open to selection over veinlessness-if-heat-shocked, given the 
artificial selective regime imposed by Waddington?  However, the availability of genes does not 
automatically mean that they will occur together..  If both the first gene for lack of heat shock protein 
and the second gene for the deformed developmental protein and were rare in the original population, 
then there would have been little chance of their ever occurring together (or of their remaining together 
if they did).  So the Stage 1 selection of veinlessness-if-heat-shocked is still essential, in order to 
provide a population where the first gene is common, and the second gene therefore likely to yield the 
phenotype innate veinlessness required for its selection.  
With niche construction Baldwin effects, by contrast, the prior learning of P alters 
selection pressures so as render genes for P advantageous, where they wouldn’t have 
been advantageous otherwise.  I shall consider two ways in which niche construction 
can yield Baldwin effects.  First, I shall briefly look at an idea of Peter Godfrey-
Smith’s, which I shall call ‘keeping up with the Joneses’.  Then, in the next section, I 
shall show that social learning is itself a form of niche construction which yields 
powerful Baldwin effects.
Niche construction itself extends far more generally than the Baldwin effect.  It occurs 
whenever some new activity by some population creates new selection pressures on 
their genes.  For example, the evolution of innate adult lactose tolerance in some 
human populations is a response to new selection pressures generated by the 
availability of milk from domesticated cattle.  Again, the innate disposition of cuckoo 
chicks to eject host eggs from the nests is clearly a genetic adaptation to the parental 
cuckoo practice of parasitizing other species’ nests.  (Cf. Laland et al, 2000.)  
However, these examples are not Baldwin effects, as I am understanding the term, 
since they are not cases where the learning of some behaviour lead to the innateness 
of that self-same behaviour.  (Rather, dairy farming leads to innate lactose tolerance;  
parental nest parasitizing leads to innate egg ejection by offspring.)    
Godfrey-Smith, in considering niche construction as a possible source of Baldwin 
effects, focuses on the possibility that it may become more important to do P when 
everybody else is doing it (thus ‘keeping up with the Joneses’).  In such cases, the 
widespread learning of P through some population may itself increase the selective 
advantage of acquiring P quickly and reliably—that is, via genes rather than learning.  
In such cases, the selective coefficient of genes for P would display a kind of ‘positive 
frequency dependence’—their selective advantage would increase as P becomes more 
widespread in the population.  (Note, however, that this is not the kind of ‘frequency 
dependent selection’ normally discussed in the population genetics literature, in that 
here the selective coefficient will increase with the frequency of the phenotype P, 
which may be learned as well as innate, rather than the frequency of some allele that 
makes P innate.)
It is not obvious that the Jones’s mechanism will work.  Suppose that some trait P can 
either be genetically fixed by allele PG, or left to learning by allele PL.  If P is adaptive, 
and PG delivers it more quickly and reliably than PL, as we are assuming, then won’t 
PG already have an advantage over PL at Stage 0, even before any organisms acquire P 
from learning at Stage 1?
This is true enough.  But it remains possible that PG may have an even greater 
advantage over PL at Stage 1, and that this increased advantage may be crucial in 
driving it to fixation.  Imagine that the environment changes so that some crucial 
resource becomes too scarce for all to enjoy it—a climatic change means there are 
now only enough nuts for 90% of the population, say.  Animals who are able to climb 
nut trees (P) are able to get nuts ahead of those who have to wait for the nuts to fall.  
But tree climbing is very laborious to acquire from learning, as opposed to getting it 
innately from some gene PG.  In such a case, PG will indeed have some slight 
advantage over PL even at Stage 0 when scarcely any animals can in fact climb trees, 
since it will eliminate any danger of ending up with no nuts, yet avoid the costs of 
learning P.  However, this advantage will not be great at Stage 0, for the animals will 
still have a good chance of getting nuts without climbing trees at all, and so a lack of 
PG won’t make it essential for them to incur the costs of learning P.  At Stage 1, 
however, when most of the population has learned to climb trees, there will be no 
chance of getting nuts without climbing, and so any animal without PG will be forced 
to undergo the costs of learning P in order to survive, thus greatly increasing the 
selective advantage of PG over PL.
9[9]
So I agree with Godfrey-Smith that niche construction Baldwin effects might 
sometimes arise from biological imperatives to ‘keep up with the Jones’s’.  However, 
by focussing on this kind of case, Godfrey-Smith seems to me to miss a far more 
obvious and important species of niche construction Baldwin effects, namely, those 
occasioned by social learning.
7  Social Learning as Niche Construction
Recall the kind of example I discussed in the Introduction.  Some complex behaviour 
P is socially learned, where it is highly unlikely that any individual could learn P on 
its own.  To vary our example, consider the common herring-gull practice of opening 
shellfish by grasping them in their beaks, flying up to a suitable height, dropping the 
shellfish on a hard surface, and retrieving the flesh from the broken shell.  There is 
reason to suppose that this behaviour is socially transmitted. [Ref?]  Now, once a 
given populations of gulls possesses this culture for opening shellfish, then this itself 
will create selection pressures for genes that make them better at acquiring it.  An 
individual with an allele that innately disposes it to grasp clams when it sees them, say, 
will learn how to get shellfish meat more quickly, since it will have less to learn than 
gulls who lack this allele.  But note that this allele would have no selective advantage, 
were it not for the pre-existing culture of shellfish-dropping, given that there would be 
no real possibility of learning the rest of the complex behaviour without any 
exemplars to copy from.  There’s no advantage in being disposed to grasp clams when 
you find them, if you don’t then fly up, drop the clams, and retrieve the meat—and 
even gulls for whom the grasping disposition is innate would be highly unlikely to 
figure out the rest of this behaviour by individual trial-and-error if they could not 
learn it from other gulls.
So this then gives us another kind of niche construction Baldwin effect.  The prior 
existence of some learned behaviour (Stage 1) creates selection pressures for genes 
that will render that selfsame behaviour innate.  And the prior learning of that 
behaviour is indeed essential here, since the genes in question would have no selective 
advantage in an environment (Stage 0) where no animals were learning the behaviour 
and so providing exemplars for further learners.
The analysis of such social learning Baldwin effects is complicated by the fact they 
will inevitably involve genetic assimilation as well as niche construction.  To see this, 
note that, when a socially learned behaviour creates selection pressures for genes for 
components of that behaviour, it is precisely by making the behaviour easier to learn.  
                                                
9[9]  Note that this mechanism doesn’t require that there is selection of genes for learning P at Stage 1, 
as originally required by Godfrey-Smith (2003).  It is quite enough that P is produced by general and 
long-standing learning mechanisms operating in some new environment.  (But see Godfrey-Smith, 
forthcoming, where he corrects this.)
The social learned behaviour is significant as a niche constructor because at earlier 
stages it enables the remaining components of the overall behaviour to be learned.10[10]
So, insofar as some socially learned behaviour functions as an environmental niche 
that selects for its own innateness, it will be by lightening learning loads, which 
means that the requirements for genetic assimilation will also be satisfied.  As in 
section 4, we will have a complex behaviour with a number of components, none of 
which is adaptive on its own.  Given this, genes for those components might 
individually seem to lack any selective advantage, given the improbability of any one 
of them finding itself together with the others.  However, once we take learning into 
account, then we can see that these genes are individually advantageous after all, 
since each on its own lightens the amount of learning needed to acquire the overall 
adaptive P.
Still, it would be a mistake to think that the niche construction aspect of social 
learning adds nothing to the genetic assimilation mechanism discussed earlier.  The 
niche construction aspect also tells us why it is possible for organisms to learn all the 
rest of P when only a few components of the behaviour are innate.  Earlier, when 
discussing genetic assimilation itself, we simply took it for granted that such learning 
would be possible.  However, in the cases now at issue, it is highly unlikely that any 
animals with only a few relevant genes will be able to learn all the rest of P by 
individual trial-and-error—in our example, it was highly unlikely that even a herring 
gull for whom clam-grasping is innate would be able to learn all the rest of the clam-
opening behaviour on its own.  The prior learned culture of P is thus essential for an 
environment in which the rest of P can be socially learned.  It is precisely because the 
other gulls are already displaying the clam-opening behaviour that a tyro with only a 
few innate elements can acquire the rest of the behaviour.
With socially learned behaviours, then, we get Baldwin effects twice over.  The prior 
learning of P (Stage 1) is crucial to P’s becoming innate in two quite different ways.  
Not only does P need to be learned while each of the earlier IGs get selected, as in all 
genetic assimilation, but also the niche construction means there wouldn’t be any 
selective pressure on those IGs to start with unless the socially learned P were being 
displayed by conspecifics.
8  The Significance of Social Learning
I have focused on the structure of two kinds of Baldwin effect:  genetic assimilation 
and niche construction.  And I have argued that the genetic selection of social learned 
behaviours can constitute both kinds of Baldwin effect simultaneously.  But is this 
anything more than a conceptual oddity?  Why should it matter that certain possible 
                                                
10[10]  Thus note how the niche construction story ceases to apply at the point where P becomes entirely
innate.  Imagine that genes for all but the ‘last’ component Pn in some complex behaviour have already 
become fixed in the population, and consider the remaining competition between alleles NG and NL for 
this last component.  This last NG will still have an advantage over its competing NL, since it ensures P 
more cheaply and reliably.  However, this last advantage won’t depend on the prior culture of P, since 
once an animal has this last NG it will have nothing left to learn from its conspecifics.  Given that the 
other genes are all in place, this last NG would be favoured over the alternative NL even if no other 
animals were displaying P.
processes may fit the half-formed ideas of an unimportant nineteenth-century theorist 
in two different ways?
Well, there’s nothing especially significant about possible Baldwin mechanisms, even 
doubly Baldwinian ones.  To show that certain processes are in principle biologically 
possible is of merely theoretical interest, in the absence of any reason to think that 
they are empirically important.  Maybe the social learning of certain behaviours can 
lead to their own innateness in a way that fits Baldwin’s conjecture twice over.  But 
unless such cases play an important empirical role in evolution, this would be nothing 
more than an odd quirk of intellectual history.   
However, I think that there is some reason to suppose that these doubly Baldwinian 
social learning processes are empirically important.  This is because social learning 
vastly expands the class of learnable adaptive behaviours.  Many behaviours are far 
too complex for animals to have any realistic chance of acquiring them by individual 
learning alone (even with one or two genes to help them on their way).  So, if 
everything was left to individual learning, these behaviours could never be genetically 
assimilated—with no real chance of the rest of the behaviour being learned, no IG
would have any initial selective advantage, and genetic assimilation wouldn’t get 
going.  But now add in social learning.  This means that as soon as one lucky or 
exceptional individual somehow acquires P, then it becomes possible for the others to 
pick up P socially, when it wouldn’t possible for them to learn P otherwise.11[11]  And 
this will give the relevant IGs an initial advantage after all, and allow genetic 
assimilation to get going.  The point is that genetic assimilation requires that the 
relevant P be learnable, and social learning renders many interesting Ps learnable 
when they wouldn’t otherwise be.
Because of this, I suspect that precisely my double Baldwin effect is responsible for 
the innateness of many complex behavioural traits.  If we have genetic assimilation, 
then that is one kind of Baldwin effect: the components of some adaptive behaviour 
progressively come under genetic control, because each relevant gene facilitates 
learning the rest of that same behaviour.  However, in many such cases the relevant 
genes wouldn’t facilitate learning the rest of that behaviour, were it not for the help of 
the second kind of Baldwin effect:  some adaptive behaviour is learnable, and so open 
to genetic assimilation, only because that same behaviour is available as an exemplar 
for social learning.
Of course, this process does require that ‘one lucky or exceptional individual 
somehow acquires P’ independently of social learning, in order to get the social 
promulgation of P off the ground.  And this prerequisite may seem to be in some 
tension with the idea that double Baldwin effects will be important precisely with Ps 
that are ‘too complex for animals to have any realistic chance of acquiring them by 
individual learning alone’.  But this tension is more apparent than real.  For note that, 
                                                
11[11]  Here is one point where differences between different kinds of social learning may matter (cf. 
section 2.3 above).  Suppose that some unusual individual does acquire some adaptive behaviour P 
non-socially.  What ensures that others will copy this individual, rather than others without P?  Not all 
modes of social learning would seem to privilege models who display adaptive behaviours over 
others—in particular, blind mimicry—(iii)—won’t do this.  But perhaps that doesn’t matter, if we 
suppose that individual reinforcement acts as a moderator of social learning, perpetuating only those 
behaviours that yield reinforcing rewards.  
in the absence of social learning, all individuals would need to be able to acquire P by 
individual learning, in order for genetic assimilation to occur.  Given social learning, 
however, only one individual need acquire P non-socially, in order to get things 
moving.  There is no reason why one such lucky strike shouldn’t be reasonably 
probable, even if the chance of any given individual acquiring P non-socially is very 
low.  (If the probability of success in a single trail is p, the probability of at least one 
success in K independent trials is (1-(1-p)K).)12[12]  
In my Introduction I said that I would defend the importance of Baldwin effects 
against those who say that they are at best special cases of the more general 
phenomena of genetic assimilation and niche construction.  I have now argued that, 
when the social learning of some behaviour leads to its own innateness, genetic 
assimilation and niche construction combine to produce a particularly powerful 
mechanism of natural selection.  I take this to show that this kind of Baldwin effect at 
least is worth singling out for special attention.
Let me conclude with an empirical prediction.  If my doubly Baldwinian social 
learning mechanism has indeed been important for the evolution of complex 
behaviours, as I have hypothesized, then we should expect to find, somewhat 
paradoxically, that complex innate behaviours are more common in species that are 
good social learners than in other species.  True, any such correlation will be diluted 
by the fact that the relative costs of learning and genetic control will not always 
favour bringing socially learned traits under genetic control (in the way I have been 
assuming since section 2.1).  Even so, if I am right in thinking that social learning 
vastly expands the range of behaviours open to genetic assimilation, species that are 
good general social learners should still display significantly more complex innate 
behaviour than other species.  Unfortunately I lack the expertise to assess this 
prediction myself.  But I would be very interested indeed to know whether or not the 
comparative zoological data bear it out.13[13]
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